Informs Annual Meeting 2017

MD12

INFORMS Houston – 2017

MD12

MD13

332B Social Networks and Service Operations Sponsored: Manufacturing & Service Oper Mgmt,

332C Game Theory Contributed Session

Service Operations Sponsored Session

Chair: Alok Raj, IIM Lucknow, Lucknow, India, fpm15002@iiml.ac.in 1 - Consolidation in Urban Goods Distribution - Cost Allocation Based on Approximate Solutions Joen Dahlberg, Linköping University, Norrköping, Sweden, joen.dahlberg@liu.se, Stefan Engevall, Maud Göthe-Lundgren, Jenny Karlsson We consider the cost allocation problem that arises when a number of stakeholders, responsible for the distribution of goods in an urban area, collaborate by goods consolidation. This problem is formulated as a cooperative game, where the characteristic function value is defined as the cost of a Vehicle Routing Problem (VRP). For large sized problems, it is impractical to solve the VRP to optimality. We investigate the effects of allocating costs based on approximate VRP solutions. The viability, quality and validity of the method are verified by applying the method on instances of real life data. 2 - Bileratal Competition in Crowd Logistics with Game Theory and Emotion Theory Yi Song, Huazhong University of Science and Technology, Wuhan, China, songyi@hust.edu.cn, Bin Hu With the increasingly use of sensor-embedded smartphones, many crowdsourcers and a large population of service providers form a bilateral competition market, where crowdsourcers compete for the limited logistics service and service providers compete for the limited budget. In this paper, we present emotion theory embedded with a game theory of such market. We formulate the dynamics behavior of service providers as an evolutionary game, take their feelings of crowdsourcers and then present a simulation model for the implementation of the evolution process. For crowdsourcers, we use a non-cooperative game. Through this paper, we can understand the dynamic evolution of the crowd logistics market. 4 - An Ascending Auction for Freight Forwarders Collaboration in Capacity Sharing Minghui Lai, Assistant Professor, Southeast University, China, Room A-411, Economics and Management Building, Southeast University (Jiulonghu Campus), Nanjing, China, laimh@seu.edu.cn We propose an ascending auction mechanism for the capacity sharing problem, where each forwarder submits a set of bundles of capacity for their shipping requests. To achieve strategy-proofness, all the winning bundles for an accepted request must have the same payment and the payment is ascending during the iterations. To improve social welfare, the mechanism iteratively expands the set of bundles and approximates the loss of private revenues to search optimal allocations, using the dual solution derived from minimizing primal-dual slackness. We prove that the mechanism is strategy-proof, individually rational, weakly budget balanced, and finitely convergent. 5 - Sustainable Supply Chain Channel Coordination using Game Theoretic Approach Alok Raj, IIM.Lucknow, Lucknow, India, fpm15002@iiml.ac.in The importance of triple bottom line has been widely recognized by both industry and supply chain (SC) literature. However, in the context of SC coordination, simultaneous treatment of greening effort, social responsibility, and profit have received scant attention in the extant literature. This paper focuses on this gap and we propose a generalized analytical model for a dyadic supply chain with triple bottom line approach. We formulate a supplier-buyer stackelberg game and design linear two-part tariff contract for coordination. Our generalized analytical model is able to capture the dynamics of pure profit maximizing SC, green SC, and socially responsible SC as special cases.

Chair: Gad Allon, PA, United States, gadallon@wharton.upenn.edu Co-Chair: Eren Basar Cil, University of Oregon, Lindquist College of Business, Eugene, OR, 97403-1208, United States, erencil@uoregon.edu 1 - Managing Workplace Flexibility: the Case of Agents with Task Preferences Vasiliki Kostami, London Business School, London, United Kingdom, vkostami@london.edu, Rouba Ibrahim Flexibility in operations is beneficial in matching supply and demand in both the manufacturing and service industries but it does not come for free. In many workplaces, employees are expected to excel in different skills as part of their job but they are also heterogeneous in their preferences to perform certain tasks associated with their employment. We study and compare two innovative flexibility arrangements in the workplace that are related to the task assignment against the traditional one where the task routing is a decision made by the firm with the ultimate objective of improving both the employees’ welfare and the employer’s revenue. 2 - Multiple Equilibria When Servers Value Idleness and Compensation Dongyuan Zhan, University College London, UCL.School of Most common queueing systems used for service system design assume the servers work at fixed rates. However, real-life service system are staffed by people, who may change their service speed in response to their compensation incentives and idleness utility. We study the equilibrium service rate under this setting. We find that depending on the servers’ idleness utility function, two equilibria, which allow different service rates and amount of idleness, may exist. The system manager may induce one of the equilibria by imposing more restrictions on servers’ behavior. 3 - Hidden-City Travel and its Impact on Airfare Woonghee Tim Huh, University of British Columbia, Sauder School of Business, Operations and Logistics Division, Vancouver, BC, V6T.1Z2, Canada, tim.huh@sauder.ubc.ca, Jaelynn Oh We study the cause of hidden city fare and the effect of hidden city travelers on airfare when airlines price compete on hub-and-spoke flight networks. 4 - Does Marginal Wage Reveal your Cost of Waiting? Simin Li, Kellogg School of Management, Northwestern University, 2211 Campus Drive, Evanston, IL, 60208, United States, simin.li@kellogg.northwestern.edu, Achal Bassamboo, Martin Lariviere We investigate how an agent’s cost of waiting depends on income structure and non-market activities. We find the conventional metric, marginal wage, is only a fair estimation to marginal cost of waiting if earnings are smooth. The equality breaks down once any friction is introduced. The marginal wage can over or under estimate agents’ true cost of waiting. 5 - Skill Management in Large-scale Service Marketplaces Eren Basar Cil, University of Oregon, 1208 University Of Oregon, Lindquist College of Business, Eugene, OR, 97403-1208, United States, erencil@uoregon.edu, Gad Allon, Achal Bassamboo We consider a large-scale service marketplace where the moderating firm can run two skills tests on agents to assess if their skills are above certain thresholds. Our main objective is to evaluate the effectiveness of skill screening as a revenue maximization tool. We find that skill screening leads to negligible revenue improvements in marketplaces where agent skills are highly compatible. As the compatibility of agent skills weakens, we show that the firm starts to experience as much as 25% improvement in revenue from skill screening. Apparently, the firm can reap the most of these substantial benefits when it runs only one test. Management, Gower Street, London, WC1E 6BT, United Kingdom, d.zhan@ucl.ac.uk, Amy R.Ward

240