Informs Annual Meeting Phoenix 2018

INFORMS Phoenix – 2018

MC52

4 - Assigning Course Schedules: About Preference Elicitation, Fairness, and Truthfulness Martin Bichler, Technische Universitat Munchen, Department of Informatics, Boltzmannstr. 3, Munich, 85748, Germany, Soeren Merting Course assignment is a wide-spread problem in education. Often students have preferences for bundlesof course seats or course schedules over the week, which need to be considered. Bundled Probabilistic Serial (BPS) is a randomized mechanism satisfying ordinale efficiency, envy-freeness, and weak strategy- proofness. We report a first application of BPS in a large-scale course assignment application at the Technical University of Munich. In particular we focus on preference elicitation, which is challenging due to the combinatorial explosion of packages. Joint Session BOM/Practice Curated: Experimental Supply Chain Management Sponsored: Behavioral Operations Management Sponsored Session Chair: Andrew M. Davis, Cornell University, Cornell University, Ithaca, NY, 14853, United States 1 - Private Information and Endogenous Matching in Supply Chains: Theory and Experiments Kyle Hyndman, University of Texas at Dallas, 800 W. Campbell Rd, SM31, Richardson, TX, 75080, United States, Andrew M. Davis We investigate a supply chain setting where a supplier’s cost may be private information (but they may disclose it) and buyers and suppliers may endogenously match into pairs. After forming pairs, the two parties engage in a dynamic bargaining setting. Suppliers always make less than theory predicts, whether their cost is known or private information. This effect is especially pronounced under private information for high cost suppliers, because buyers make more aggressive bargaining offers in such a setting. Thus, contrary to theory, a second result is that higher cost suppliers actually benefit from disclosing their private costs, in an effort to achieve a more favorable outcome while bargaining. 2 - The Commitment Conundrum of Inventory Sharing Shan Li, City University of New York, Baruch College, 55 Lexington Avenue, New York, NY, 10010, United States, Kay-Yut Chen In this paper, we take a behavioral lens to study the impact of different transfer price contracting schemes and inventory sharing schemes on local decision making of decentralized retailers, constructing a behavioral model, incorporating bounded rationality, fairness, and psychological pain of excess supply to explain the findings. 3 - Is Simplicity the Ultimate Sophistication? Wholesale Pricing vs. Non-linear Pricing Behrooz Pourghannad, University of Minnesota, Minneapolis, MN, United States, Guangwen Kong, Tony H. Cui This paper studies a manufacturer’s choice of contract when facing a boundedly rational retailer. In a supply chain with a fully rational retailer a wholesale price contract cannot perform better than buy-back and revenue sharing contracts. When the retailer is boundedly rational, we find that a wholesale price contract can dominate both buy-back and revenue sharing contracts. We characterize the condition under which a wholesale price contract is the optimal choice of the manufacturer. Our findings are supported by laboratory experiments in which human suppliers choose a contract to offer to computerized boundedly rational retailers. 4 - Auctions, Efficient Coordination, and Strategic Complementarities James Fan, Naval Postgraduate School, Monterey, CA, United States, Anthony Kwasnica Do auctions always lead to efficient production outcomes? We examine this question in a team coordination game, and we find that the degree of coordination as a result of an auction is sensitive to the degree of strategic complementarity. Our results are examined in relationship to the behavioral learning model proposed by Crawford and Broseta (1998). n MC54 North Bldg 232B

n MC52 North Bldg 231C Social Influence in Shared Mobility Emerging Topic: Social Media Analytics Emerging Topic Session Chair: Arif Mohaimin Sadri, Florida International University, Miami, FL, 33174, United States 1 - Exploring the Effects of Social Resources on Leisure Activity and Autonomous Vehicle Intention Michael Maness, University of South Florida This presentation showcases results from a survey exploring the relationships between leisure activity variety and frequency and individuals’ access to social resources. This includes general measures of social resource access, the position generator, and specific measures of social resource access, the resource generator. Additionally, the survey explores autonomous vehicle usage intention and its relation with access to information through interpersonal networks. 2 - Social Influence during Emergency Evacuations: Evidence from On-line and Off-line Social Networks Arif Mohaimin Sadri, Florida International University, Miami, FL, United States Social networks serve the purpose of transmitting warning messages by disseminating information about an impending threat. Individuals having more social connections can be expected to receive more warning information. This study uses both ego-centric personal networks (off-line) and Twitter (on-line) data to understand social influence on evacuation responses during Hurricane Sandy. n MC53 North Bldg 232A Matching Theory II Sponsored: Auction and Marketing Design Sponsored Session Chair: Umut Dur, NCSU, Raleigh, NC, 27695, United States 1 - School Assignment with Siblings William Phan, North Carolina State University, Raleigh, NC, United States, Thayer Morrill, Umut Dur We study the problem of school assignment with siblings. Existing mechanisms used in centralized assignment do not formally account for such issues. As such, school districts implement ad hoc protocols that may result in instability and mismatched siblings. First, we propose a new notion of stability that takes into consideration the existence of siblings. Second, using the many-to-many matching with contracts framework, we propose a new mechanism that satisfies our proposed stability property and is strategy-proof. Using data from Wake County School District, we run a counterfactual analysis and show how our mechanism improves upon previous years’ assignments. 2 - Efficient and Incentive Compatible Liver Exchange M. Utku Unver, Boston College, 140 Commonwealth Avenue, Chestnut Hill, MA, 02467, United States, Haluk Ergin, Tayfun Sonmez Living-donor liver transplantation is widespread in parts of the world and living- donor liver exchange has already been practiced in several countries to overcome blood-type incompatibilities. A living donor can donate either his smaller left lobe or larger right lobe, although the latter is substantially riskier. Despite the elevated risk, right-lobe donation is often utilized due to size compatibility requirements. We model liver exchange as a market design problem, focusing on the logistically simpler two-way exchanges. We introduce an individually rational, Pareto- efficient, and incentive-compatible mechanism that truthfully elicits the right-lobe donation willingness of donors. 3 - Strategy-proof Size Improvement: Is It Possible? Umut Dur, NCSU, 2801 Founders Drive, 4102 Nelson Hall, Raleigh, NC, 27695, United States, Oguz Afacan In object allocation problems, we say that a mechanism size-wise dominates another mechanism if the latter never allocates more objects than the former does, while the converse is true for some problem. Our main result shows that no individually rational and strategy-proof mechanism size-wise dominates a non- wasteful, truncation-invariant, and extension-responding mechanism. We also show that whenever the number of agents does not exceed the total number of object copies, no group strategy-proof and efficient mechanism, such as top trading cycles mechanism, is size-wise dominated by an individually rational, weakly population-monotonic, and strategy-proof mechanism.

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