Informs Annual Meeting Phoenix 2018

INFORMS Phoenix – 2018

TE47

4 - Capturing Industrial Co2 Emissions in Spain: Infrastructures, Costs, and Break-even Prices

3 - Quality in Competitive Fresh Produce Supply Chains with Application to Farmers’ Market Deniz Besik, Isenberg School of Management at UMass Amherst, 77 North Prospect, Amherst, MA, 01002, United States, Anna Nagurney In this paper, we first present explicit formulae for fresh produce quality deterioration based on chemistry and temperature. We then focus on farmers’ markets. The popularity of farmer’s markets has been growing internationally due to consumers’ greater awareness. Farmers’ markets, as examples of direct to consumer channels and shorter supply chains, are then studied in the framework of game theory in both uncapacitated and capacitated versions. Illustrative examples in the case of peaches and various scenarios, including production disruptions, in a case study of apples in Massachusetts, provide quantitative evidence of the applicability of our supply chain network approach. 4 - Supply Chain Network Competition Among Blood Service Organizations: A Generalized Nash Equilibrium Framework We present a Generalized Nash Equilibrium model of supply chain network competition among blood service organizations which compete for donors and business from hospitals. The model incorporates link capacities, associated arc multipliers to capture perishability, bounds on number of donors, and lower and upper bounds on the demands. The concept of a variational equilibrium is utilized to transform the problem into a variational inequality problem. The proposed algorithmic procedure is applied to numerical examples in order to illustrate the impacts of disruptions on RBC prices, net revenues of the blood service organizations, and their overall utilities. n TE49 North Bldg 230 Practice- Game Theory I Contributed Session Chair: Ben Hermans, KU Leuven, Naamsestraat 69, Leuven, 3000, Belgium 1 - Spectrum Measurement Markets for Tiered Spectrum Access The framework for spectrum sharing in the 3.5 GHz band allows for Environment Sensing Capability operators (ESCs) to measure spectrum occupancy to enable commercial users to use this spectrum when it is idle. We consider a scenario in which two spectrum access firms (SAs) seek to access a shared band of spectrum and must purchase spectrum measurements from one of two ESCs. Given the measurements they purchase, the SAs compete on price to serve customers. We consider two cases. When the SAs share the same single band of spectrum, having different qualities of measurements available to different SAs can lead to better economic welfare. When each has a separate licensed band, this difference does not matter. 2 - Coffee Supply Chain Optimization with Respect to Real Value of the Water Shervin Espahbod, PhD Student, Wilfrid Laurier University, Waterloo, ON, Canada, Michael Haughton On average, each cup of coffee consumes 500 liters of water. Water footprint clarifies whether the source of water for each product or activity is sustainable or unsustainable. We measured how awareness about water footprint and water taxation of products can shift consumption behavior. First, our behavioral survey explained average global water footprint of verity of coffee. Second, different coffee brands (e.g., Starbucks coffee, Tim Hortons) have different water footprints. With respect to the real value of water that brands consume, they maximize their total profits in an optimal Nash equilibrium. 3 - Two-stage Invest-defend Game: Balancing Strategic and Operational Decisions Abdolmajid Yolmeh, Rutgers, The State University of New Jersey, 96 Frelinghuysen Road CoRE Building, Room 201, Piscataway, NJ, 08854, United States, Melike Baykal-G rsoy Protecting infrastructures involves making both strategic and operational decisions. Although usually analyzed separately, these decisions influence each other. To this end, we present a game-theoretic, two-stage model between a defender and an attacker involving multiple target sites. In the first stage, the defender (attacker) allocates investment resources to target sites in order to improve the defense (attack) capabilities. In the second stage, the players decide which target site to defend or to attack. The results reveal that an increase in defense (attack) investments on a target site (increases) decreases the probability of both defending and attacking that target. Pritha Dutta, University of Massachusetts-Amherst, 9L Brandywine Drive, Amherst, MA, 01002, United States, Anna B. Nagurney Arnob Ghosh, Post-Doctoral Research Associate, Purdue University, 300 N. Grant Street, West Lafayette, IN, 47905, United States,, Randall Berry, Vaneet Aggarwal

Olivier Massol, IFP School & City, University of London, 228 av. Napol on Bonaparte, Rueil-Malmaison, 92852, France, St phane Tchung-Ming, Albert Banal-Estanol We examine the conditions for the deployment of a largescale CO2 pipeline and storage infrastructure in Spain by 2040. Our approach combines optimization and cooperative game-theroretic concepts. It allows to determine the optimal infrastructure needed to connect a geographically disaggregated set of emitting and storage clusters, along with the threshold CO2 values necessary to ensure that the considered emitters will make the necessary investment decisions. Policy implications derived from this model concern the elaboration of relevant, pragmatic recommendations to envisage CCS deployment locally, focusing on emitters with lower substitution options toward low-carbon alternatives. n TE47 North Bldg 229A Risk-Averse Stochastic Modeling and Optimization Emerging Topic Session Chair: Jose Luis Walteros, University at Buffalo, SUNY, 413 Bell Hall, Buffalo, NY, 14260, United States The ability to compare random outcomes based on the decision makers’ risk preferences is crucial to modeling decision making problems under uncertainty. In this tutorial, the primary focus is on the stochastic preference relations based on the widely-applied risk measure conditional value-at-risk (CVaR) and the second- order stochastic dominance (SSD). We present single- and two-stage stochastic optimization problems that feature such risk-averse preference relations. We discuss the main computational challenges in solving the problems of interest, and for finite probability spaces we describe alternative mathematical programming formulations and effective solution methods. n TE48 North Bldg 229B Sustainability and the Triple Bottom Line: Social, Environmental (or Ecological) and Financial Sponsored: Energy, Natural Res & the Environment Environment & Sustainability Sponsored Session Chair: Jose Cruz, University of Connecticut, Hartford, CT, 06103, United States 1 - The Sustainable Supply Chain Network Competition with Environmental Tax Policies Dong Li, PhD, Babson College, Wellesley, MA, United States, Min Yu, Jose Cruz This model captures different environmental tax policies in a multitiered supply chain network competition context. We investigate the impacts of emission tax policies and product differentiation on competing firms, and compare the effects of different environmental policies on firms’ decisions and total emission. The results indicate that the implementation of such policies along with an increase in consumers’ environmental concerns can not only motivate the firms to perform sustainable operations, but also reduce the total carbon footprint. This model can be used by firms and policymakers to evaluate the effects of different environmental tax policies in a supply chain competition context. 2 - Risk Sharing Contracts in Sustainable Supply Chains Shivani Shukla, PhD, University of San Francisco, San Francisco, CA, United States In this paper, we develop a framework that captures the effects risk sharing contracts in sustainable supply chain management. In particular, we analyze the impact of strategic sharing on supply chain disruption risks and costs and we evaluate the supply chain performance of risk sharing contracts. The numerical examples highlight that it is not a priori clear which participant in the supply chain network will benefit from increased information sharing activities. Our models indicate that the beneficiary of reduced information sharing costs is in some cases dependent on the negotiation power of participants and that it is also dependent on the type of risk sharing contract used. 1 - Risk-Averse Stochastic Modeling and Optimization Nilay Noyan, Sabanci University, Sabanci University, Orhanli/Tuzla Istanbul, 34956, Turkey

396