Informs Annual Meeting Phoenix 2018

INFORMS Phoenix – 2018

TE53

7 - A Novel Dynamic Routing Framework for Shared Mobility Services

3 - Coordinating Capacity Negotiations In Semiconductor Industry Ankit Bansal, North Carolina State University, 304, Daniels Hall, 111 Lampe Drive, Raleigh, NC, 27695, United States, Reha Uzsoy, Karl Kempf We model the negotiations between multiple product development groups (PDGs) and a manufacturing group (MFG) for access to manufacturing capacity to support product development activities in the semiconductor industry. We develop an iterative combinatorial auction framework based on Lagrangian relaxation that maximizes corporate profit subject to the resource constraints of both organizations. We consider the case when MFG and PDGs receive limited budgets from corporate management who acts as a trader for both groups. The approach aims to achieve coordinated decisions between the two groups with reasonable duality gaps and constrain them to behave truthfully in the negotiation framework. 4 - Refund Of Uncertainty-reducing Project Preparation In Procurement Auctions Marion Ott, RWTH Aachen University, Templergraben 64/V, Aachen, 52062, Germany, Karl-Martin Ehrhart, Ann-Katrin Hanke This paper analyzes second-price procurement auctions in which bidders can take costly pre-auction measures that reduce their uncertainty about their costs for their offered good or service. An example is project preparation for auctions for renewable energy support. The measures are either mandatory or optional prior to the auction, but need to be taken prior to project realization. For both cases, we investigate the effect of a refund of the costs for the measures by the auctioneer on his procurement costs, on the participation level in the auction, and on the probability of an efficient outcome. We compare different refunding options. n TE55 North Bldg 232C Managing Innovation in Novel Contexts Emerging Topic: New Product Development Emerging Topic Session Chair: Xiaoyang Long, University of Wisconsin-Madison, Madison, WI, United States 1 - Optimal Incentive Contracts in Project Management Anyan Qi, The University of Texas at Dallas, 800 W. Campbell Rd SM 30, Richardson, TX, 75080, United States, Milind Dawande, Ganesh Janakiraman, Qi Wu We study the contract-design problem faced by a firm for executing a project consisting of multiple tasks, each of which is performed by an individual contractor whose efforts (work-rates) are not observable. We study the case when these tasks can be performed in parallel as well as the case when they have to be performed sequentially. 2 - Do Business Method Innovations Create Value. A Study of Public U. S. Firms in Manufacturing and Distribution Ever since Amazon patented their “1-click” ordering method, there has been significant interest in understanding the value potential of business method patents. In this study, we examine the impact of business method patents on the financial performance of public US manufacturers and distributors, and find that firms investing in high-quality business method patents generate higher market value. 3 - Patent Grant Delays and Inventors’ Future Patenting Param Pal Singh Chhabra, Student, Georgia Institute of Technology, 800 West Peachtree NW, Atlanta, GA, 30308, United States, Manpreet Singh Hora, Karthik Ramachandran Patent grant delays have the potential of negatively affecting future patenting activities of inventors. Utilizing patents application data, spanning more than three decades, published by the USPTO, we verify this negative relationship. Our results also confirm that the negative relationship is more pronounced in lone- inventors (as compared to teams), and co-inventors (as compared to a prime inventor) in a team. 4 - Employee Mobility and Process Innovation in Manufacturing Fabian J. Sting, University of Cologne, Albertus-Magnus-Platz, c/o WiSo-Sekretariat Universitaetsstrasse 91, Cologne, 50923, Germany, Philipp Benjamin Cornelius, Bilal Gokpinar Production employees can be a valuable source of innovative ideas to improve operational efficiency. We empirically investigate how mobility affects the innovation value created by those employees. We examine the immediate and long term (static and dynamic) implications as well as the role of direction of employee moves on innovation outcomes. Tian Chan, Emory University’s Goizueta Business School, 1300 Clifton Road, Atlanta, GA, 30322, United States, Anandhi S. Bharadwaj, Deepa Varadarajan

Yue Guan, PhD. Candidate @ MIT, Massachusetts Institute of Technology, 77 Massachusetts Avenue, Room 3-339K, Cambridge, MA, 02139, United States Shared Mobility on Demand (MoD) services like Uber, Lyft, and Didi have shown that a continuum of solutions can be provided between traditional private transport and public mass transit. Here we propose a novel shared MoD framework which generates a dynamic route for multi-passenger transport, using a new concept of space window that introduces a degree of freedom to help reduce system cost in designing the optimal route. An Alternating Minimization based algorithm is developed. Its analytical properties are characterized. Detailed computational experiments are carried out that demonstrate its advantages in computational efficiency and optimality compared to standard optimization solvers. 8 - Dynamic Capabilities for Sustainable Smart Cities Abdulrahman Habib, University of North Texas, 1404 Sombre Vista Drive, Denton, TX, 76205, United States, Victor R. Prybutok This study explores the application of dynamic capabilities in smart city parking solutions. Dynamic capabilities theory includes a cycle of æsense’, æseize’, æalign’, and ætransform’. In the posited model the city can æsense’ problems and æseize’ data to make it available for data mining and machine learning that ætransforms’ the problems in parking and allow solutions. Sensing allows ongoing data evaluation and provides an opportunity for continuous quality improvement. This approach æaligns’ with a comprehensive sustainable smart city strategy. 9 - Fast Computation of Global Solutions to the Single-period Unit Commitment Problem for Electricity Market Applications Zhibin Deng, University of Chinese Academy of Sciences, 80 E. Zhong Guan Cun, BLVD 7 RM 221, Beijing, 100190, China The single-period unit commitment problem has significant applications in electricity markets. This paper proposes an extremely efficient global optimization algorithm for solving the problem. We propose a conjugate function based convex relaxation and design a special dual algorithm to compute a tight lower bound of the problem in O(nlog n) complexity. Computational experiments show that the proposed algorithm solves test instances with 500 integer variables in less than 0.01 seconds, whereas current state-of-the-art solvers fail to solve the same test instances in one hour.

n TE53 North Bldg 232A Multi-unit Auctions Sponsored: Auction and Marketing Design Sponsored Session

Chair: Kyle Woodward, University of North Carolina at Chapel Hill, Chapel Hill, NC, 27599-3305, United States 1 - Multi-product Supply Function Equilibria

Par Holmberg, Research Insitute of Industrial Economics, Grevgatan 34, Stockholm, SE10215, Sweden, Keith Ruddell, Bert Willems We solve for Nash equilibria in a procurement auction with two heterogeneous divisible goods and a uniform price for each good. There are (dis)economies of scope in production and goods could be substitutes or complements for the procurer. Before demand is realized, each firm offers a vector of supply functions where supply of a good depends on the prices of both goods. We show that payoffs and the allocation of underlying goods are invariant to bundling. For quadratic costs and linear demand, bundles can be chosen such that it is equivalent to trade divisible packages in two separate auctions. Such packaging simplifies the analysis of and the operation of a multi-product auction 2 - Random Mechanisms for the Sale of Divisible Goods Kyle Woodward, University of North Carolina at Chapel Hill, Department of Economics, Gardner Hall, CB #3305, Chapel Hill, NC, 27599-3305, United States Uniform-price and discriminatory auction formats are used to allocate many divisible commodities, but which of these two formats generates better outcomes is both theoretically and practically ambiguous. I investigate mechanisms which are convex combinations of these two formats. I provide a characterization of equilibrium in this model, and prove uniqueness of equilibrium in a natural class. With linear marginal values, the discriminatory auction strictly revenue- dominates any convexification of the two auction formats. I show that the equilibrium multiplicity of the uniform-price auction smoothly disappears as the convexification tends toward a discriminatory auction.

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