2016 INFORMS Annual Meeting Program

MD25

INFORMS Nashville – 2016

2 - Quantitative Approaches For Measuring And Relieving Congestion In A Dialysis Unit At A Hospital: The Case Of Compassionate Dialysis Olga Bountali, Southern Methodist University, 3145 Dyer street, Dallas, TX, United States, obountali@smu.edu, Sila Çetinkaya, Vishal Ahuja We examine a congested healthcare delivery setting due to emergency treatment of a chronic disease. A prominent example of the problem of interest is congestion in the emergency room due to arrival of unfunded ESRD patients needing dialysis (a.k.a., compassionate dialysis). Unfortunately, this is the only treatment option for undocumented immigrants with ESRD., i.e., when their clinical condition is deemed as life-threatening. We model the problem as a queueing network with recurrent arrivals and service and examine various performance metrics impacting patient welfare and social cost. 3 - Efficient Sampling From Large Databases For Controlled Trials Sanjay Mehrotra, Professor, Northwestern University, Evanston, IL, 60208, United States, mehrotra@northwestern.edu, Daniel Apley, Liwen Ouyang Controlled trials are ubiquitously used to investigate the effect of a medical treatment. The trial outcome can be dependent on a set of patient covariates. Traditional approaches have relied primarily on randomized patient sampling and allocation to treatment and control groups. We will present an approach that uses optimal design of experiments (DOE) concepts to select the patients for the treatment and control groups, based on their covariate values, in a manner that optimizes the information content in the data. 4 - Optimal Stopping For Response-guided Dosing Jakob Kotas, PhD, University of Portland, Portland, OR, 37221, United States, kotas@up.edu One important decision in response-guided dosing is when to stop treatment. In practice, stopping often occurs for patients in remission, or due to a finding of futility or a desire to switch to a different drug. We have previously developed a stochastic dynamic programming framework for response-guided dosing which tailors dose to a patient’s stochastic evolution of disease state. In this talk we present an extension of that model that allows for stopping before the scheduled end time. Our numerical simulations show optimality of stopping below a threshold state. We also outline structural properties of the stopping formulation, including monotonicity of the threshold state with respect to time. MD25 110A-MCC Project Related SCM II Invited: Project Management and Scheduling Invited Session Chair: Xiaoqiang Cai, The Chinese University of Hong Kong, Shatin NT, xqcai@se.cuhk.edu.hk 1 - Procurement Strategies With Asymmetric Yield Information Houcai Shen, Nanjing University, hcshen@nju.edu.cn In this paper, we study firm purchase behavior when her supplier has private information about his yield rate. 2 - Optimal Design Of Omnichannel Xiaolin Xu, Nanjing University, xuxl@nju.edu.cn Nowadays omnichannel has received much attention in retail industry. However, how to design an appropriate omnichannel strategy is a challenge facing the retailers. For example, retailer can provide BOPS (buy online and pickup at store) or STOP (shipment to store for consumers to pickup at store), in addtion to the traditional O2O (online vs. offline) channels. The channel BOPS shares the store inventory with the offline channel, while the channel STOP shares the DC (distribution center) inventory with the online channel. We investigate how these two omnichannel strateties affect the market segmentation, fill rates at store and the retailer’s profit. 3 - Pricing And Ordering Strategies Of Supply Chain With Selling Gift Cards Wenqing Shi, University of Electronic Science and Technology of China, Chengdu, China, shiwenqing1218@163.com, Jingming Pan, Xiaowo Tang Gift cards is one popular promotion way in market, which is widely used to replace traditional gift cash and gift products, especially when gift givers do not know gift receivers’ performances. Basing on this phenomenon, we develop a Stackelberg model to analyze the supplier’s and retailer’s optimal strategies with selling gift cards. We also exam the influences of different parameters on the optimal decisions and the supply chain performance.

4 - Product Quality Choice In Two-echelon Supply Chains Under Post-sale Liability: Insights From Wholesale Price Contracts Jianchang Fan, Doctor, University of Electronic Science and Technology of China, Qingshuihe Campus: No.2006, Xiyuan Ave, West Hi-Tech Zone, Chengdu, 611731, China, love.andyfan@163.com, Debing Ni A two-stage game model in a supply chain consisting of a manufacturer (M) and a Retailer (R) is built via a wholesale price contract. M is liable for the harm caused by its low-quality products. In the equilibrium, we find that (1) in spite that product liability positively affects the wholesale price, M’s quality level, the contracted quantity and the supply chain members’ profitability are independent of it; (2) in response to changes in liability-related factors, the product quality is in conflict with the profits for both M and R, but the quality and the profit increase in quality improvement efficiency; (3) the wholesale price serves as a medium for M to share its ex ante expected liability cost with R. MD26 110B-MCC Auctions, Markets, and Mechanism Design Invited: Auctions Invited Session Chair: Brian Baisa, Amherst College, Amherst, MA, United States, bbaisa@amherst.edu 1 - Mechanism Design For Team Formation Greg Leo, Vanderbilt University, Nashville, TN, United States, g.leo@vanderbilt.edu, Martin van der Linden, Jian Lou, Yevgeniy Vorobeychik, Myrna Wonders Team, or coalition, formation is a fundamental problem in AI and game theory. While there has been extensive research on coalitional stability, especially in hedonic games, the problem of designing mechanisms for coalition formation has received relatively little attention. Theoretically, most of what is known about such design problems is negative; for example, no mechanism that always matches soulmates (individuals who prefer to be matched together) is strategyproof in general. We describe some of our recent positive results about achieving efficiency, incentive compatibility, individual rationality, and coalitional stability in important restricted classes of hedonic preferences. 2 - Equilibrium In a Uniform-Price Auction withPrivate Values Justin Burkett, Wake Forest University, burketje@wfu.edu In a model incorporating bidders with private information bidding for multiple units of a homogeneous good, I show that the equilibrium bid functions can be completely characterized, sometimes in closed form. The equilibrium bid functions can be considered aggregated bid functions from first-price single unit bidders. This property allows one to extend results from the single-unit auction literature to this multi-unit setting. 3 - Strategic Ironing In Pay-as-bid Auctions: Equilibrium Existence With Private Information Kyle Woodward, University of North Carolina at Chapel Hill, Gardner Hall, CB 3305, Chapel Hill, NC, 27599-3305, United States, kyle.woodward@unc.edu I establish the existence of pure-strategy Bayesian-Nash equilibria in divisible- good pay-as-bid auctions with private information, and show that such equilibria can approximate equilibria in nearby multi-unit auctions. I show that equilibrium strategies exhibit strategic ironing, a reduction of bids below what might be expected. Strategic ironing has implications for the tractability of equilibrium strategies. 4 - Efficient Multi-unit Auction Design Without Quasilinear Preferences Brian Baisa, Amherst College, bbaisa@amherst.edu I study efficient multi-unit auction design when bidders have private values, multi-unit demands, and non-quasilinear preferences. Without quasilinearity, the Vickrey auction loses it desired incentive and efficiency properties. I construct a novel mechanism that retains the desirable properties of Vickrey auction, even in cases when bidders have non-quasilinear preferences. When bidders have single dimensional types, the mechanism (1) is dominant strategy incentive compatible, (2) is Pareto efficient, and (3) provides no subsidies. If bidders types are multi- dimensional, I show that there is no mechanism that satisfies these three properties.

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